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A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RESOLVE THE "REMAINING
UNPAID" PARADOX OF SECTION 60c OF THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT
A PRiME objective of the Bankruptcy Act is to secure equal distribution
of a debtor's assets among creditors of the same class. 1 In furtherance of this
policy, Section 60a defines certain payments made within four months of
bankruptcy as preferential,2 and Section 60b authorizes the trustee in bank-
ruptcy to require that such payments be returned to the estate for the benefit
of all general creditors.3 Section 60c seeks to promote fairness with regard
to such voidable preferences 4 and to encourage new credit to insolvent debt-
ors d by providing:
1. See, e.g., Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318, 320, 321 (1931); Canright v. General
Finance Corp., 35 F. Supp. 841, 844 (E.D. Ill. 1940). See also 3 CoLum, Bin'nmtrc-
if 60.01 (14th ed., "Moore & Oglebay, 1941) ; 1 REIrGmTON, BANxiUPIC " §§ 1W, 17 (5th
ed., Henderson, 1950).
2. "A preference is a transfer, as defined in this title, of any of the property of a
debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or
suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four months before the filing by or
against him of the petition initiating a proceeding under this title, the effect of which
transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than
some other creditor of the same class." 30 ST.T. 562 (1893), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §
96(a) (Supp. 1952). See 3 COLLIR, op. cit. supra note 1, VU 60.02, 60.07-60.35; 4A
REmnxroN, op. cit. supra note 1, §§1657-1702.
3. 30 STAT. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1946).
However, even if there is a preference under § 60a, there can be no avoidance under
§ 60b unless the transferee had reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent at the
time of payment. Such payments are merely technical prefernees. 3 Cor.u%, op. cit. sufra
note 1, ffff 60.02, 60.52-60.56; 4A RZEmiNGToN, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 1657, 1653, 1703-1712.
There are several other sections available to the trustee to secure cquality of distribu-
tion. Section 67a invalidates every lien obtained by judicial proceedings within fkur months
of bankruptcy "if at the time when such lien was obtained such person was insolvent or
... if such lien was sought and permitted in fraud of this title." 30 STAT. 564 (IS93),
as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1946). See 4 CoIuER, op. cit. supra note 1, rfi &7.03-
67.19. Section 67d defines fraudulent transfers and ordinarily allows the trustee to avoid
them. 30 STAT. 564 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1946). See 4 COALM-% op.
cit. supra note 1 fjif 67.29-67.43. Scction 70c gives the trustee the status of a lien creditor
as to all property of the bankrupt at the date of bankruptcy. 30 ST.T. 565 (1898), as
amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (Supp. 1952). 4 CoLLTER, op. cit. supra note 1, 'qI 70.45-70.65.
Section 70e allows the trustee to avoid any transfer made or suffered or obligation incurred
by a debtor "which, under any Federal or State law applicable thereto, is fraudulent as
against or voidable for any other reason by any creditor of the debtor." 30 STAT. 562
(1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1946). See Collier, op. cit. supra note 1, tfu
70.69-70.95.
A trustee may often have a choice of sections in order to avoid a prc-bankruptcy
transfer but sometimes such transfers will not come within any section. See 3 Cu.nUm,
op. cit. . pra note 1, if 60.01.
4. See, e.g., Walker v. Wilkinson, 296 Fed. 850, 852 (5th Cir. 1924) ; Gans v. Ellison,
114 Fed. 734, 736 (3d Cir. 1902) ; Atlas v. Eastern Yarn Mills, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 478, 479
(E.D.N.Y. 1939).
5. Courts have recognized that payment of debts encourages new credit Sce, e.g., C. S.
294 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol.64
"If a creditor has been preferred, and afterwards in good faith gives
the debtor further credit without security of any kind for property
which becomes a part of the debtor's estate, the amount of such new
credit remaining unpaid at the time of the adjudication in bank-
ruptcy may be set off against the amount which would otherwise be
recoverable from him."'
However, the meaning of Section 60c has been obscured by conflicting judicial
interpretations. 7 Moreover, even if applied literally, it will produce results
inconsistent with its underlying policy.
8
Morey Mercantile Co. v. Schiffer, 114 Fed. 447, 449 (8th Cir. 1902) ; Kimball v. E. A.
Rosenham Co., 114 Fed. 85, 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1902). See also 3 CouLx.R, op. cit. Supra
note 1, at 248-9. If the creditor knows the debtor is insolvent, the payment may be a
preference and therefore not likely to be much of an inducement, since it may be necessary
to return it. But if § 60c were amended to allow a set-off of all preferential payments
extended so long as they did not exceed the amount of the new credit, creditors would
be more willing to extend new credit. An amendment to accomplish this result is pro.
posed p. 302 infra.
6. 30 STAT. 562 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 96(c) (1946).
Although most of the avoidance sections have undergone frequent revisions, 3 COLLItn,
op. cit. supra note 1, Tif 60.05, 60.06; 4 id. irir 67.02, 70.02, 70.03; § 60c has remained tn-
changed since its original enactment in 1898. 3 id. 1 60.67; 4A REMINGTON, Op. cit. suipra
note 1, § 1719. Thus certain aspects of this section seem well-settled. The "good faith"
requirement does not mean that the creditor must be unaware of the debtor's insolvency;
it merely requires that the money be given for an honest purpose and that the creditor
not act in such a way as intentionally to defeat the act. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Tredway,
195 U.S. 271, 274-5 (1904). The "further credit" entitled to be set off must be given
without security of any kind. See, e.g., In re Talbot Canning Corp., 35 F. Supp. 680, 687
(D. Md. 1940). It must become a part of the debtor's estate but it need not remain a
part of it until bankruptcy and the creditor need not show what the debtor did with it.
See, e.g., Kaufman v. Tredway, 195 U.S. 271, 274-5 (1904). Finally, the new credit
must be given after the creditor has already received a preference, e.g., Roble v. Meyers
Equipment Co., 114 F. Supp. 177, 182 (D. Minn. 1953), and it can be set off only against
antecedent preferential payments, e.g., Robie v. Meyers Equipment Co., supra; Price
v. Derbyshire Coffee Co., 128 App. Div. 472, 112 N.Y. Supp. 830 (1908). But cf.
Walker v. Wilkinson, 296 Fed. 850 (5th Cir. 1924).
One court has said that the § 60c set-off against recovery of a preference is not ex-
clusive; whenever a set-off will promote equality of distribution among creditors of the
same class, as determined by the entire transaction between the creditor and bankrupt, the
set-off is proper. Walker v. Wilkinson, supra at 853. Cf. Gans v. Ellison, 114 Fed, 734,
737 (3d Cir. 1902).
Section 60c should be distinguished from Section 68, 30 STAT. 562 (1898), as amended,
11 U.S.C. § 108 (1946), which allows a set-off in cases where there are mutual debts
and mutual credits between the bankrupt's estate and a creditor. The former may be
invoked although the bankrupt has no debt due from the creditors. In some situations,
however, § 60c and § 68 may be asserted in the same action. 3 COLLIEM, op. Cit. supra
note 1, ff 60.67; 4 COLLiER, op. cit. supra note 1, IT 68.02.
7. Compare the judicial theories applied in Jaquith v. Alden, 189 U.S. 78 (1902);
Walker v. Wilkinson, 296 Fed. 850 (5th Cir. 1924); Grandison v. National bank of Coln-
merce of Rochester, 231 Fed. 800 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 242 U.S. 644 (1916) ; In re Ace
Fruit & Produce Co., 49 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Talty v. Ross, 14 F.2d 240 (D.
Mass. 1926).
8. See text at notes 22-43 infra.
NOTES
A major source of judicial confusion has been the application of the "run-
ning account" or "net result" rule to situations where the use of Section 60c
was appropriate. 9 This rule was applied where there was an open account
between parties regularly engaged in business, payments being made at
various times and credit extended at others.10 If the creditor had no know-
ledge of the debtor's insolvency,11 only the net rcsult of all transactions within
the four month period was considered.' Instead of classifying all payments
as preferential and then allowing a set-off, payments were regarded as prefer-
ential under Section 60a only to the extent they exceeded the new credit.
Theoretically this "net result" rule became obsolete in 1903.2a It never
applied when the creditor had reasonable cause to believe the debtor insol-
9. See, e.g., In re Fred Stem & Co., 54 F2d 478 (2d Cir. 1931) ; Talty v. Ross, 14 F2d
240 (D. Mass. 1926). See also 3 CoLER, op. cit. smpra note 1, 1ff 57.19, 6023, 60.67; 4A
RnmiGTON, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1719.
Although the "net result" doctrine and § 60c appear similar, there are important differ-
ences between the two. "Section 60c will apply to isolated transactions; there is no re-
quirement for an open, continuing series of transactions between creditor and debtor as in
the running account situation. On the other hand, § 60c does require that there be a credit
subsequent to the voidable preferential transfer. This is not the case under the 'net result
rule.' The rule has been applied even though the last transaction in the series was a payment
by the debtor." 3 Com.m, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1057. Cf. Campanella v. Liebowitz, 103
F.2d 252, 253-4 (3d Cir. 1939) ; In re Colton Export & Import Co., 121 Fed. 663, 664 (2d
Cir. 1903).
10. " 'Where a creditor has a claim for a balance due against an insolvent debtor after-
wards adjudicated a bankrupt, upon an open account for goods sold and delivered four
months before the adjudication in bankruptcy, and during said period makes a number
of sales of merchandise on credit to the insolvent debtor, which becomes a part of the
debtor's estate, and during the same period receives payments of sums on account, from
time to time, which payments are received in good faith without knowledge of the
debtor's insolvency on the part of the creditor, the sales exceeding in amount during said
period the payments made during the same time, has the creditor under such circum-
stances received a preference which he is obliged to surrender before his claim shall be
allowed under the bankruptcy act?' .. . The first question is answered in the negative
on the authority of Jaquith v. Alden, 189 U.S. 78." Yaple v. Dahl-Millikan Grocery Co.,
193 U.S. 526, 527 (1904). See also Joseph Wild & Co. v. Provident Life & Trust Cv.,
214 U.S. 292 (1909); C. S. Morey Mercantile Co. v. Schiffer, 114 Fed. 447 (8th Cir.
1902).
11. 'Matter of Farmers' Store & Supply Co., 214 Fed. 505, 506 (D.W. Va. 1914). See
also 3 CoLLrE, BAmRUPTCY 249, 847-8 (14th ed., Moore & Oglebay, 1941) ; 4A P Exmna-
TON, B m iup-cy § 1719 (5th ed., Henderson, 1950).
12. See, e.g., cases cited note 10 supra. See also 3 CoLUER, op. cit. smpra note 11,
Fiff 57.19, 60.23, 60.67; 4A RE=UNGTox, op. cit. smpra note 11, § 1719.
13. Prior to 1903 it was necessary for a creditor to surrender technical as well as
voidable preferences before he could prove his claim under § 57g. Pirie v. Chicago Title &
Trust Co., 182 U.S. 438 (1901). Since technical preferences could not be avoided by the
trustee, the creditor had the option of either surrendering them and proving his claim
against the estate or keeping them and giving up his claim. However, a 1993 amendment
provided that technical preferences need not be surrendered before one can prove his claim.
32 STAT. 799 (1903), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 93(g) (1946). See 3 Cou.se, op. di. supra
note 11, at 110, 250, 251, 766-8, 1054-5.
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vent ;14 conversely, if the creditor had no reason to believe the debtor insolvent
any preference would be merely technical,', and since 1903 it has not been
necessary to return such preferences.'( Nevertheless, several cases since 1903
have seemed willing to apply the rule to running accounts even when the
creditor had reason to believe the debtor was insolvent. 17 Moreover, courts
professing to apply Section 60c were sometimes so influenced by the "net result"
doctrine that they confused the two or applied Section 60c without adhering
to its requirements.' 8
Ordinarily, the same result is reached either by calling everything a prefer-
ence and applying Section 60c or by applying the "net result" rule. In the
typical case a large debt exists at the start of the four month period and all
preferential payments can be applied to it, thus leaving the new credit com-
pletely unpaid.19 For example, assume that prior to the four month period
the debtor (D) owed the creditor (C) $50,000. Sometime within the period
D paid C a $7000 preference. Subsequently C advanced new credit of $5000
to D. If the "net result" rule is followed there is a preference of $2000, the
amount by which the debtor's estate was diminished within the four months.20
If Section 60c is strictly applied, the $5000 unpaid new credit can be set off
14. See authorities cited note 11 supra.
15. See note 3 supra.
16. See note 13 supra.
Thus it has been suggested that "the rule was a product of its time, namely a time
when preferences were deemed to be subject to surrender for the sole reason that they
were technically preferences, irrespective of the creditor's knowledge of the debtor's in-
solvency. It was designed to mitigate the rule of Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co.
which held that anything amounting to a technical preference under § 60a had to be
surrendered before a claim of the same creditor could be allowed. The reason for
the rule would thus seem to have vanished in 1903, when, as previously pointed out,
§ 57g was amended so as to require surrender only in certain cases of voidable transactions,
which in turn required some intent or knowledge on the part of the creditor amounting
to bad faith. Accordingly, the rule may now be considered as largely obsolete. . . ." 3
COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 249-50. See Campanella v. Liebowitz, 103 F.2d 252, 253
(3d Cir. 1939).
The "net result" rule has been severely criticized. See Judge Learned Hand's com-
ments in Wilcox v. Goess, 92 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1937) ; In re Fred Stern & Co., 54
F.2d 478, 481 (2d Cir. 1931). And see 3 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 848-9.
17. In re Marley-Morse Co., 275 Fed. 832 (7th Cir. 1921) ; Dunlap v. Seattle Nat.
Bank, 93 Wash. 568, 161 Pac. 364 (1916). Cf. Walker v. Wilkinson, 296 Fed. 850 (5th
Cir. 1924) ; In re Fred Stern & Co., 54 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1931). Contra: Chisholm v.
First Nat. Bank of Leroy, 269 Ill. 110, 109 N.E. 657 (1915). The net result rule was
judicially developed to avoid results courts regarded as inequitable. Therefore, if neces-
sary to achieve equitable results, courts might in the future discard the requirement that
creditors have no reason to believe the debtor insolvent.
18. See 3 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 251-2.
19. See, e.g., the fact situations in, In re Evansville Broom Co., 29 F.2d 643 (7th Cir.
1928) ; Atlas v. Eastern Yarn Mills, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 478 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
20. See note 12 supra. This assumes that the only transactions during the period were
the $7000 payment and $5000 new credit.
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against the $7000 preference,21 again resulting in an obligation to repay
$2000.
A problem arises, however, if substantially all of the new credit is repaid.
Section 60c dearly says that "the amount of such new credit rcnaining unpaid
at the time of ... bankruptcy may be set off."2' If the strict wording of the
statute is followed, some unusual results are obtained. Consider the following
example involving a series of transactions and repayment of much of the
new credit:
C advances to D D pays C
(all voidable preferences)
Jan. 1 $1000








Dec. 15 Filing of petition in bankruptcy
The creditor has e.x-tended credits of $4000, and $3000 of this is new credit
extended after a preference.3 The debtor has repaid $3500. If the "net result"
rule is followed, $500 of the payments to C is L preference since the net result
of the transactions within the four month period decreased the estate of the
debtor by $5C0.24 The creditor must return $500 and become a general
creditor for $1000.25 However, a court might consider the transactions as
coming in pairs, in which case there would be unpaid credits of $100 on the
third pair of transactions (Oct. 15 and Nov. 10) and $400 on the fourth pair
(Nov. 25 and Dec. 2) .28 Here C could claim $500 as a general creditor with-
21. This assumes that the $7000 payment was applied to the previous debt of $50,000.
22. 30 STAT. 562 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 96(c) (1946) (emphasis added).
23. The payment on Sept. 2 was a preference and, according to § (0c, only new credit
extended after a preference is entitled to be set off. Therefore, the advances on Sept. 21,
Oct. 15, and Nov. 15 fall within § 60c, but the advance on Jan. I does not.
24. See note 12 supra. In computing the preference under the "net result" rule, the
advance on Jan. 1 would be omitted since it is not within the four month period. Thus,
within the four months there were advances of G3000 and payments of $-3500. The debtor's
estate in that period had been depleted by $500 and that is the preference that would have
to be returned.
25. Since this $500 is a preference and C knew D was insolvent, C would have to
return it under § 60b. See note 3 supra. He would then stand on an equal basis with all
other creditors of his class in trying to collect his claim for $1000.
26. A court might say that each pair of transactions (i.e., Jan. 1 & Sept. 2, Sept. 21
& Oct. 2, Oct. 15 & Nov. 10, Nov. 25 & Dec. 2) constituted a single transaction and hence
that no credit was extended except in the last two pairs where the credit exceedcd the
payment. Some cases say that if the advances of credit and the payments form a single
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out repaying anything.27 Finally, a court might say there was new credit of
$3000 which could be set off only against the antecedent payments of $2900.28
C would have to return the last payment of $600 and become a general creditor
fox' $1100. All of the foregoing alternatives appear equitable. 29 The difficulty
transaction the payments are not preferences. In re Perpall, 271 Fed. 466, 468 (2d Cir.
1921); Bridges v. Hart, 200 N.C. 685, 687, 158 S.E. 242, 243 (1931).
But if the payment is made for an antecedent debt, it is a preference, even if the
time between the extension of credit and payment is very short. In re Great Lakes Lumber
Co., 8 F.2d 96, 97 (W.D. Pa. 1925) ; Seattle Ass'n of Credit Men v. Daniels, 15 Wash.
2d 393, 397, 130 P.2d 892, 894 (1942). In National City Bank v. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50,
58 (1913), the Court refused to find a single transaction when a bank advanced money to
a brokerage firm early in the day, but later in the day demanded and obtained collateral
security. Another court, in holding that payments regularly made within 10 days were
not cash transactions, said: "If the parties, by agreement, can treat a sale of goods on
10 days' time as a cash transaction, they may also, by agreement, treat a sale on 30 or 60
days' or longer as a cash transaction, and practically defeat the operation of sections
57g and 60a of the bankrupt act .... A sale of goods to be paid for in 10 or 30 days
is not, in fact, a cash transaction, and cannot, by agreement of the parties, or a usage of
merchants, be regarded as such within the meaning of the bankrupt law." In re John
Morrow & Co., 134 Fed. 686, 687-8 (S.D. Ohio 1901).
Thus, it seems probable that a court would not treat the transactions in the above
hypothetical as coming in pairs. Instead, each pair would probably be treated as an ex-
tension of credit and a preferential payment.
27. Since a court following this theory would say that none of the payments were
preferences, there would be nothing for C to return. He would have merely advanced
credit of $500 which he could claim as a general creditor.
28. Most courts hold that the new credit can be set off only against antecedent
preferential payments. E.g., Robie v. Myers Equipment Co., 114 F. Supp, 177 (D. Minn.
1953) ; Price v. Derbyshire Coffee Co., 128 App. Div. 478, 112 N.Y. Supp. 830 (1903).
But cf. Walker v. Wilkinson, 296 Fed. 850 (5th Cir. 1924). Thus, the Sept. 21 credit
could be set off against the Sept. 2 payment, Oct 15 against Oct. 2, and Nov. 25 against
Nov. 10. Under this approach $2900 of payments have subsequent credit to offset; but
as there is no subsequent credit to offset the Dec. 2 payment of $600, it would have to
be returned.
29. Since each of these alternatives appears equitable, a court might follow one of
them rather than apply § 60c strictly. Courts have consistently shown a desire to help
the individual creditor. Thus, they developed the "net result" rule which greatly aided indi-
vidual creditors by allowing them to retain payments which they would otherwise have
had to return. See notes 9-12 supra. Before 1903 many courts interpreted § 60c broadly
to allow a set-off against technical as well as voidable preferences. Eg., Gans v. Ellison,
114 Fed. 734 (3d Cir. 1902) ; McKey v. Lee, 105 Fed. 923 (7th Cir. 1901); In re Topliff,
114 Fed. 323 (D. Mass. 1902). Contra: In re Oliver, 109 Fed. 784 (W.D. Mo. 1901).
Such a broad interpretation of § 60c clearly helped the individual creditor since, otherwise,
he would have had to return these technical preferences before he could prove his claim
under § 57g. See note 13 supra.
There has been a long struggle between trustees in bankruptcy and creditors over the
transactions that could be avoided. Congress has made a continual effort to increase
the avoidance powers of trustees so that all creditors of the same class would be treated
equally. But courts repeatedly developed doctrines such as "relation back" and "pocket
lien" that favored certain creditors over other creditors of the same class. See 3 CoLuIAM,
BANKRUPTCY 1111 60.37, 60.39, 60.50 (14th ed., Moore & Oglebay, 1941); Kupfer, The
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is that each is contrary to the wording of the statute.3 0 If the statute is fol-
lowed and only the new credit renainibg unpaid is set off, a set-off of only
$500 would be allowed. The creditor would have to repay $3000 and become
a general creditor for $3500. 31 The Second Circuit has already reached such
a result.
32
Thus a creditor may often be better off if he is not paid in full. Assume that
at the start of the four month period D owed C $1000. Thereafter D paid C a
$1000 preference and C subsequently advanced new credit of $1000. -If these
were the only transactions between the two, the preferential payment would
apply to the prior debt and the new credit would remain unpaid. Therefore,
the $1000 unpaid new credit can be set off against the preferential payment. C
can keep $1000, repay nothing, and become a general creditor for $1000. But
if, after the above transactions and before bankruptcy, D paid C an additional
$1000, so that at the time of bankruptcy he owes C nothing, an extraordinary
result is obtained. Under such circumstances there is no new credit remaining
unpaid and, according to the strict wording of Section 60c, C has nothing to
set off. Thus C must repay the entire $2000 and become a general creditor
for that amount. Hence, he would have been well-advised to refuse the last
payment.
3 4
Similar problems may arise whenever a debtor owes a creditor both for
credit extended before the four month period and for credit extended within
the period. The debtor might specifically apply payments to the new credit,
Recent Amendment of Section 60a of the Bankrnptcy Act, 24 J.N.A. REF. BAZxM. 86
(1950). Although these particular doctrines have probably been abolished by subsequent
congressional action, 52 STAT. 869 (1938), 64 STAT. 24 (1950), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 96(a) (Supp. 1952), they indicate a judicial attitude adverse to a literal application
of the Bankruptcy Act.
30. "Where the Bankruptcy Act is silent, equitable principles will govern. But the
equitable powers of the court are to be exercised within the limits laid down by the Act
and subject to and consistent with any specific provisions contained in it." 1 CoLLiun.
op. cit. mtpra note 29, at 165. See 1 REamw=ro1N , BANKRUPrCY § 22 (5th ed., HenderEon,
1950).
31. There is only $500 remaining unpaid since C has advanced $4000 and been repaid
$3500. C can set this $500 unpaid new credit off against the $3500 preferential payments
which he would otherwise have to return. Thus, he can keep only $00 and must return
$3000.
32. Grandison v. National Bank of Commerce, 231 Fed. 800 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
242 U.S. 644 (1916). A New York district court subsequently reached what appears to
be a contrary result. In re Ace Fruit & Produce Co., 49 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
33. This is the ideal situation for C under a strict interpretation of § W.c. It arises
when C is paid all of the credit extended prior to the start of the four month period plus
half of the difference between the old debt and the new credit if the new credit
exceeds the old debt. If the old debt exceeds the new credit, C will not vant to be repaid
any of the new credit. This, of course, presumes that the new credit meets all the require-
ments of § 60c.
34. The payment of the final $1000 has almost certainly cost C money, since he will
almost never receive full payment of his debt as a general creditor. See the statistics
compiled in MooRa & CouxTRYSIA.q, DErsrR's .AxD CEDrroR's RIGHTS 163 (1951).
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leaving the older debt unpaid ;35 indeed, an uninformed creditor might insist
on this as a condition for the extension of the new credit.3, But then there
would be less new credit "remaining unpaid" at the time of bankruptcy and
the creditor would have to repay part of the preferences.
8 7
To take a similar hypothetical involving a larger number of transactions, consider the
following:
C advances to D D pays C
(all preferences)
Jan. 1 $1000









Dec. 15 Filing of petition in bankruptcy
Assume that all payments to C met all the requirements of voidable preferential payments
and that all advances to D within the four months period met all the requirements of
new credit under § 60c and were not given for present consideration, there being an
antecedent debt in each case. C has advanced new credit of $4000 and total credit of
$5000. He has been repaid $4000. There is new credit remaining unpaid of only $1000 to set
off against the $4000 preferences. Thus, C can keep only $1000. He must return $3000
and become a general creditor for $4000. C would have been better off if he had refused
the last $1500 and had been repaid only $2500. Then he would have $2500 unpaid new
credit to set off against the $2500 he had received. Hence, he could have kept $2500;
whereas by being repaid $4000 he can keep only $1000. In either case he would be only a
general creditor for the balance. See the formula in note 33 supra.
35. A debtor may direct to which one of several debts a payment shall be applied,
but if he fails to make a designation the creditor may apply it as he wishes. If both fail
to designate, the law will decide. Standard Surety & Casualty Co. of New York v.
United States, 154 F.2d 335 (10th Cir. 1946). But circumstances may indicate the in-
tended application of a payment. F. M. Slagle & Co. v. Bushell, 70 S.D. 250, 16 N.W.2d
914 (1944).
Parties may by agreement change the application of payments previously made if no
third person is prejudiced. United States v. Brent, 236 Fed. 771 (W.D.S.C. 1916) ; see
Smart v. Owen, 208 Ark. 662, 669, 187 S.W.2d 312, 315 (1945). However, if a debtor
agreed to change the application of a payment from the new to an old debt, general
creditors who would benefit by the repayment of the preferences might be considered
prejudiced by the change of application.
36. Assume that D owed C a large debt that did not appear likely to be repaid. C might
agree to accept an interest bearing note in payment of the old debt and to extend new
credit if D promised to repay the new credit within 10 days of each new extension. Thus,
all payments might be applied to the new credit when they could have been used just as
easily to pay the old debt. Compare the facts in In re John Morrow & Co., 134 Fed. 686
(S.D. Ohio 1901).
37. For example, assume that on Jan. 1, D owes C $5000. On Jan. 15, the four month
period begins. On Jan. 16, D pays C a $1000 preference. On February 1, C extends new
credit of $1000 to D. On February 10, D pays C $1000, specifically applying it to the
February 1 advance according to an agreement between the parties. On March 1, April 1,
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The results apparently required by Section 60c are undesirable. One ob-
jective of the Section 60c set-off is to encourage creditors to ex-tend new
credit to an insolvent debtor to help him avoid bankruptcy. Knowledge that
the creditor can set off any new credit he extends after being preferred is de-
signed to promote such credit extension.38 But Section 60c, if strictly applied,
does not accomplish that objective when the new credit is repaid. Hence, the
creditor cannot be sure of obtaining a set-off unless he has a large amount due
from the debtor at the start of the four month period to which he can specific-
ally apply all preferential payments.3 9 Of course, strict adherence to the statute
means that more money is returned to the estate. But this money is coming from a
creditor who, by advancing new credit, has tried to help the debtor and thus in
turn aid other creditors. It seems unfair to force him to repay many of the
preferences he has received since much of what he repays may then be distrib-
uted among other creditors who have not attempted to assist the debtor.40
Moreover, the statute discriminates against both new and old creditors to
whom the debtor owes little or nothing at the start of the four month period.
Since such creditors have no large prior amount due against which to set
off preferences, they are forced to apply all current payments to the new
credit. Thus there will be less unpaid new credit at the time of bankruptcy.
Furthermore, the section discriminates against uninformed creditors. The
and May 1, C extends new credit of $1000 and on March 10 and April 10, D spccifically
pays for the credit extended earlier in the month. Since all payments after the Jan.
16 preference were applied to the new credit, there is only $1000 new credit remaining unpaid
at the time of bankruptcy. C will have to repay q3000 and become a general creditor for
$8000. If all payments had been applied to the old debt, C would have $4000 unpaid
new credit to set off against the $4000 preferences, and C could keep $4000 and become
a general creditor for $5000. Therefore, if few assets are available for general creditors,
C is harshly penalized for simply being uninformed.
38. See note 5 supra Perhaps this presumes knowledge on the part of the creditor
which he does not in fact possess. Many creditors have probably never heard of a set-off
of unpaid new credit and do not rely on § 60c at all when they extend such credit. But a
creditor who has extended credit to other debtors who have subsequently gone bankrupt
may be quite aware of the dangers, and possible benefits, of § 60c. Many trade creditors
are in this position.
A creditor can never know that a payment is actually made within the four month
period, and thus a voidable preference, since the period cannot be computed until it has
ended, that is, when the petition in bankruptcy is filed. Hence, even though C knows D is
insolvent, he may not expect him to go into bankruptcy and thtrefore may not anticipate
having to return any payments. However, the possibility that such payments may have
to be repaid will influence the actions of many informed creditors.
39. In some cases C may not be prejudiced if part of the payments are applied to the
new credit. See note 33 supra.
40. The creditor whom § 60c favors has not depleted the estate by the full amount
of the payments; he has depleted it only to the extent that the payments exceed the new
credit extended within the four month period. Therefore, it would seem that he should
be required to return only the excess. If he is forced to return all payments, he is making
a double surrender "in that he is required to give up the payments received and to lose
the new credit extended." Walker v. Wilkinson, 296 Fed. 850, 853 (5th Cir. 1924). Sce
Gans v. Ellison, 114 Fed. 734, 737 (3d Cir. 1902).
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informed creditor insists that payments be applied to any debt that arose
prior to the four month period.41 Or he avoids the preference label altogether
by demanding present consideration for any credit extended after he has
reason to believe the debtor is insolvent. 42 The uninformed creditor, who
fails to take such precautions, is the one penalized by Section 60c .
43
To assure equitable treatment of creditors and to promote extension of new
credit to insolvent debtors, Section 60c should be amended by deleting the
words "remaining unpaid." Then it would no longer be vital to a creditor that
only a certain amount be repaid or that payment be applied to a particular debt.
44
The amendment should also provide that new credit may be set off only against
prior preferential payments.4 5 This will discourage preferential payments,
just before bankruptcy, large enough to cover new credit that has already
been extended. 46 Thus, the revised section should read:
"If a creditor has been preferred, and afterwards in good faith gives
the debtor further credit without security of any kind for property
which becomes a part of the debtor's estate, the amount of such new
credit may be set off against the prior preferences which would other-
wise be recoverable from him."
41. Thus the new credit is left unpaid and can be used as an offset. See notes 35-7 supra.
42. If a debtor intends to make payments, it may be possible for him to niake them
at the same time advances are made. Then the payments would not be preferences; they
would be present consideration for part of such advances. Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438
(1917) ; Gray v. Tantleff, 273 Fed. 524 (E.D.N.Y. 1921) ; In re Williams, 60 F. 2d 130
(D. Minn. 1932). See also 3 CoIIR, BANI<RUPTCY f 60.19 (14th ed., Moore & Oglebay,
1941). If a debtor cannot make payments at the time new credit is extended, the creditor,
if he knows of the debtor's insolvency, makes the advance at his peril since any later pay-
ment may be a preference. See note 26 supra.
43. The penalty may be substantial and it will bear no relation to the degree of know-
ledge possessed by the creditor. There is no reason why the uninformed creditor should
be discriminated against in this manner.
44. See text at notes 22-37 supra.
45. Most courts have already construed § 60c as applicable only to prior preferential
payments. See, e.g., Robie v. Meyers Equipment Co., 114 F. Supp. 177 (D. Minn. 1953);
Price v. Derbyshire Coffee Co., 128 App. Div. 472, 112 N.Y. Supp. 830 (1908). However,
at least one court has applied a set-off to subsequent preferential payments. Walker v.
Wilkinson, 296 Fed. 850 (5th Cir. 1924). Therefore, it seems desirable to amend the
section to deal explicitly with this point.
46. If this provision were not inserted and a complete "net result" rule for all transac-
tions within the four month period were adopted, the door would be open for large pay-
ments to favored creditors just prior to bankruptcy. Such payments would be large enough
and given expressly for the purpose of offsetting any unused balance of new credit.
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